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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1
Was it proper for the trial Court to amend the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law in the instant matter as requested by
Plaintiff m

her "Response to Motion to (1) Amend or Make

Additional Findings, (2) Amend or Alter Judgment, and (3) for a
New Trial," filed on or about March 24, 1997 and are said
findings supported by the evidence and consistent with the
court's prior findings?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the court could enter the additional findings is a
question of law, which is given no special deference.
v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989).

Bountiful

Under Utah R. Civ. P.

52(a), the standard of review for the trial court's finding of
fact is that they shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.
ISSUE NO. 2
Is the award of property and allocation of debts by the
trial court an equitable distribution, and do the Court's
findings support such an award?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court accords the trial court considerable
1

discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced
parties.

Although the courts actions are entitled to a

presumption of validity, the decision will not be affirmed if it
is determined the trial court abused its discretion.
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993).

Hall v.

The appellate court will

approve changes in a trial court's property and debt distribution
"only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion."

Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992).
ISSUE NO. 3

What property owned by the parties is separate property and
were there any extraordinary circumstances justifying the
inclusion of separate property in the marital estate?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court accords the trial court considerable
discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced
parties.

Although the courts actions are entitled to a

presumption of validity, the decision will not be affirmed if it
is determined the trial court abused its discretion.
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993).

Hall v.

The trial court abuses its

discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings
supporting financial determinations.

Findings are adequate only

if they are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary

2

facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on
each factual issue was reached.

Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021.

ISSUE NO. 4
Is the alimony award proper in light of the property
division ordered and findings made by the court?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is that "Trial courts have
considerable discretion in determining alimony and property
distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).

The trial court abuses its discretion when it fails

to enter specific, detailed findings supporting financial
determinations.

Findings are adequate only if they are

sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on each
factual issue was reached.

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021

(Utah App. 1993).
ISSUE NO. 5
Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the Defendant's
mother's ranch, inherited by Defendant in 18 months after 5 after
the trial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The same is a question of law and the same "are reviewed for
correctness and given no special deference on appeal." Bountiful

3

v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793
P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App . 1990).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1995)
(1)

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court

may include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.5 (1996)
(7) (a)

Income may not be imputed to a parent unless

the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a
hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
The complete text of the above statutes are included in the
addendum hereto.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find
the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for
findings are not necessary for purposes of review.

4

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated
orally and recorded in open court following the close
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground,
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may
amend its findings or make additional findings and may
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When
findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be

5

raised whether or not the party raising the question
has made in the district court an objection to such
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a
motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial,
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and
conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an
issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the
minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The parties were married on March 2, 1957 and were separated

in early January of 1995.

The parties acquired as a gift from

the Defendant's parents considerable real property during the
marriage.

Although a substantial portion of the property was

sold, the value of the remaining real property acquired as a gift
from Defendant's parents, exceeded $1,000,000.

The parties had

no other substantial assets of value.
Shortly after the parties separated, Defendant was deeded
from the estate of his parents a ranch which had been in his
family for several generations.

The deed, however, proved to be

ineffective to provide clear title. Thus, the grantor therafter

6

prepared a second deed after the date of trial, all in accordance
with the probate of defendant's mother's will.
At the time of trial, Defendant, formerly a school teacher,
was working in a struggling business jointly owned by the parties
on a full-time without receiving a wage.

In 1988, he had

suffered a heart attack.
At trial, the lower court awarded the Plaintiff 97.75% of
the net value of the marital estate, together with $600 per month
alimony, based upon Defendant's "ability to earn $3,000 per
month,".
2.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on May 31,

1997 (R. 002). A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered on
September 8, 1995 (R. 114). Trial was conducted on October 10
and 11, 1996.
The court's "Judgment in re: Alimony, Property Division,
Debt Allocation, and Attorneys Fees" was entered on March 3, 1997
(R. 407). On March 13, 1997 Defendant filed a motion to (1)
amend or make additional findings, (2) amend or alter judgment,
and (3) for a new trial (R. 416).

Plaintiff also filed a motion

to supplement the judgment on March 19, 1997 (R. 431). In
response to the parties' motions, an Amended Judgment was entered
May 6, 1997 (R. 511).
3.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The trial court ordered that the findings in this matter be

7

modified and by the Amended Judgment in re:

Alimony, Property

Division, Debt Allocation, and Attorneys Fees, entered May 6,
1997, distributed the assets and debts of the parties and award
alimony to the Plaintiff.
4.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and Plaintiff were married on March 2, 1957 (R.

113).

Between 1978 and 1995, Defendant worked as an elementary

school teacher in the State of Utah (R. 83, 502, 718). He had
been employed as a teacher in California for 12 years prior to
that (R. 667).

For several years before 1995, he worked during

the summers with the school district(R. 675).
Defendant's earned approximately $3,000 per month when
teaching on a regular schedule, or $4,000 per month if he worked
during the summers (R. 502, 677, 721, 725).

Defendant worked on

a regular schedule during the 1994/95 school year and planned to
do so for 1995/96 (R. 676).
Plaintiff was primarily employed as a homemaker (R. 502,
816) .
Defendant's parents, Ezra and Mae Lytle, gifted to the
parties 40 acres of development property in 1975, on which the
parties subsequently built their home (R. 623, 624).

Portions of

the development property were subsequently sold by the parties
over several transactions to maintain a lifestyle in excess of
that which would have been afforded on a school teacher's salary.
The court found that

xx

almost all" of the present day wealth of
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the parties was received from Defendant's parents (R. 502).
During the marriage, the parties acquired a business, "HiDesert Marine.''

Both parties participated in the operation of

said business, which the trial court found had negative net value
of $150,000 at the time of trial (R. 504, 505). Although
Defendant utilized his best efforts to improve the business, it
was not a profitable operation (R. 505). However, the court
found that the Defendant "is working hard to make that business
profitable. . . ." (R. 505).
The parties separated in January of 1995 (R. 193) .
Plaintiff filed for divorce on May 31 of that same year (R. 002).
At the time of the filing of Plaintiff's complaint, 22 acres
remained of the development property (hereinafter "the 22
acres"), earlier gifted from Defendant's parents, together with a
development lot acquired with the proceeds therefrom, and the
marital home (R. 590, 591, 625). The gross value of said
properties, acquired as gifts from the Defendant's parents, was
found by the Court to be $1,020,500.

The parties had no other

assets with a net positive value other than personal property.
Through the probate of Defendant's mother's estate, a
quitclaim deed was issued in February of 1995 to the Defendant to
a ranch located in Washington County. (R. 650). At trial, the
lower court received evidence that the deed was fatally defective
to properly convey title, because the grantor was, inter alia,
not properly identified and outside the chain of title (R. 650,
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651, 652, 740). A corrected quitclaim deed was recorded in April
of 1997, and Defendant properly received title to his mother's
ranch through her will at that time, 18 months after the entry of
the decree of divorce in this matter and five months after trial.
The record has been amended to include a copy of said deed by
order of the trial court entered on May 14, 1997 (R. 520).
The only evidence given as to the value of the ranch was
that it was worth $654,000, although the trial court,
incongruously, not only took jurisdiction over the incohate
ranch, but, further found its value to be $775,000 (R. 506, 653).
The undisputed evidence given at trial indicates that the
ranch is not a money making operation (R. 677, 678). The lower
court, in its findings, described the ranching operation as
"uneconomic" and "a hobby". (R. 503).
The court entered a temporary order on August 29, 1995,
prohibiting the parties from transferring or disposing of any
property he or she has in his or her possession unless the other
party consented. (R. 109) .
For the 1995-6 school year, the Defendant took a leave of
absence and later resigned from his position with the school
district. (R. 502, 674). At the time of trial, Defendant was 60
years old and had a heart attack several years previously (R.
713, 714). The Defendant did not continue teaching due to the
commitment required by the struggling business owned by the
parties and other stresses related to his family and this action
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(R. 940, 941). The principal at Defendant's former school
testified that it was unusual for someone to still be teaching at
age 60 (R. 717). The Defendant would have had to work at least
three more years in order to obtain his full retirement (R. 670).
The Defendant worked more than forty hours per week for the
family business, High Desert Marine, after he stopped teaching,
but did not receive a salary (R. 678, 743). The trial court
found that "Defendant is working more than full-time at the two
businesses, the Boat Shop, now known as High Desert Marine, and
the Arma Coating business, and is making a good faith and genuine
effort to produce income at the same or hopefully even above the
levels that he enjoyed while he was teaching." (R. 504). The
court made no finding that the Defendant was voluntarily
uneremployed or unemployed.
Defendant borrowed an additional $55,000 and contributed
some of his inherited funds in order to invest in another
business, Arma-Coating, after the parties separation (R. 505).
After the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff did, without
Defendant's consent or knowledge, place earnest money on a
condominium, despite the fact that she had the

sole occupation

of the marital home (R. 98, 745).
In order not to forfeit said earnest money and, the trial
court found, to additionally provide a place for the Plaintiff to
live, Defendant cashed in his retirement account, in the net
amount of $56,015.00, the proceeds of which were used to pay off
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a portion of the Arma-Coating loan in order to obtain financing
of Plaintiff's condominium and also put a substantial down
payment on Plaintiff's condominium (R. 503, 594, 665, 745, 749).
The parties did concurrent therewith stipulated that
Defendant could utilize his retirement to pay off a loan and
would borrow the funds to complete the purchase of the condo (R.
595).

At trial, the court found no fault with either of the

parties for having taken the effort to save Plaintiff's earnest
money and to ensure that the Plaintiff had a reasonable dwelling
(R. 928).

In its findings, the court stated that while Defendant

cashed in the retirement "voluntarily," the court acknowledged
"the responsibility that he felt he had to provide for his then
ex-wife's housing needs in a manner appropriate to her standing
of living." (R. 503).
At the time of trial, the District Court found that the
condominium purchased by the Plaintiff had a negative net value
of almost $15,000 (R. 506, 507).
The trial court found that the Arma-Coating business
generated "some" income but had a net value of $0 at the time of
trial (R. 505).
Plaintiff testified that she needed approximately $1,500 per
month in order to maintain her standard of living (R. 822).
At trial, counsel for the Plaintiff conceded that the ranch
was not part of the marital estate, and did not assert a claim
thereto (R. 600, 601). The court, at a hearing of Defendant's
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motion to amend the judgment in this matter, did state that: "My
understanding was that it was the understanding of the parties .
. . that Mr. Lytle would receive the ranch . . . and that was his
inheritance from his parents; that was their testamentary intent;
that the parties were assuming he would receive the ranch/'
1039).

(R.

Perhaps because of this, the court made no specific

finding that the ranch was the inherited and separate property of
the Plaintiff, and not part of the marital estate.
The Defendant made allegations of adultery, but the trial
court found that those allegations had not been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence (R. 504). No other grounds for a
finding of fault in the divorce were asserted by Plaintiff.
After trial, the Court, in its Judgement entered March 3,
1997, did award the marital home, the condominium, the building
lot, and one-half of the 22 acres to the Appellee.
awarded the remaining one-half of the 22 acres.

Appellant was

He was also

awarded the business, with a negative net value, and ordered to
assume the marital debts.

The value of the marital property, as

found by the trial court, awarded to each party is as follows:

13

Property or Debt

Method of Acquisition

Value
Awarded to
Defendant
317,000.00 i

22 acres of
development
property

Gift from Defendant's
parents (originally 40
acres)

Building lot

Acquired during
marriage with property
gifted from Defendant's
parents

Personal property

Acquired during
marriage

Drive

parents

Condominium

Purchased by Plaintiff
after separation

Mortgage on
condominium

Incurred after
separation

-149,574.69

Hi-Desert Marine
Business

Acquired by parties
during marriage

-150,000.00

ArmaCoating
Business

Acquired by Defendant
since separation

Mortgage on
marital home

Incurred during
marriage

-20,009.83

Home equity line
on marital home

Incurred during
marriage

-16,039.58

Debt on
Defendant's
Corvette

Incurred during
marriage

-9,767.32

Value
Awarded to
Plaintiff
317,000.00

35,000.00

54,000.00

16,725.00
149,500.00

Accountant fees

135,000.00

0.00

-10,546.00

Value of marital assets awarded to each
party:
Percentage of marital assets awarded to
each party:

15,062.58

653,225.00

2.25%

97.75%

(R. 505-8)
By said division, Plaintiff was awarded 97.75% of the net
value of the marital estate.
The trial court further awarded Plaintiff alimony in the
14

amount of $600 per month, based upon Plaintiff's expenses of
$2,000 per month, her income of $540 per month, and the
reasonable rental value of the marital home awarded to the
Plaintiff in the amount of $850 per month.

Defendant was found

to have the "ability to produce income" of $3,000 per month and
to have expenses of $2,400 per month.

The lower court further

considered the fact that "Plaintiff also has the building lot
which is probably something that she could sell and live off for
quite a while and maybe not even have to work for a period of
time. . . ." (R. 508). After the sale of the 22 acres, the court
ordered that alimony be reduced to $300 per month (R. 514).
On or about March 13, 1997, Defendant did motion to (1)
amend or make additional findings regarding whether the mountain
meadows ranch was marital property; (2) to alter or amend the
Court's judgment regarding the property award; and (3) for a new
trial on the issue of whether the ranch was marital property.
The court by its order entered May 30, 1997, denied said motion
(R. 531).
However, at the hearing of Defendant's motion on March 27,
1997, the Court did agree with counsel for the Plaintiff that
additional findings were required.

The Court stated that:

I find that those provided and proposed and propounded
in [Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion] to be appropriate to this division. I'm not
going to change the division of this property, and I
would like those findings incorporated pursuant to your
request. . . .
I think these are an extraordinary
circumstances case. If its not, then the Court of
Appeals can tell me, but that is my ruling (R. 1123).
15

Those findings were not proposed by the Plaintiff in a memo and
memorandum as provided in Utah R. Civ. P. 52, but were suggested
by Plaintiff in a response to Defendant's motion on March 24,
1997, more than 10 days after the final judgment was entered in
this matter.

Said additional findings, although indirectly

clarifying that the ranch was not marital property, contradict
the court's prior findings.

They (1) fault the Appellant for

terminating his employment on the eve of full retirement and
liquidating his retirement account, (2) stated that the alimony
award was $900 short of Plaintiff being able to meet her
financial needs, and (3) find that the ranch ought to be
considered in the award of marital property (R. 508, 509).
On or about March 19, 1997, Plaintiff filed a motion to
correct certain clerical errors in the judgment and findings and
sought other relief.

The Court, by its order entered April 18,

1997, did order that the judgment and findings entered in this
matter should be amended due to certain clerical errors but
denied the remaining relief sought by the Plaintiff.

The amended

Judgment and Findings were entered May 6, 1997.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
1.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 52 IN MAKING FINDINGS
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) provides that a party may make a

motion to amend or make additional findings not later than 10
days after entry of judgment.

In the instant matter, the
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additional findings adopted by the court were filed by Plaintiff
more than 10 days after the entry of the Judgment.

No provision

is made under Rule 52 for the court to make a sua sponte
alteration of the findings.
2.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
The court made four additional findings, which are addressed

sequentially below.
A.

FINDING 41

The court found that:
The Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment on
the eve of full retirement. His doing so deprived the
Plaintiff of the benefit of his income and the benefit
of his retirement account had he worked until he became
entitled to full retirement benefits.
The total benefit of the retirement account was less than $70,000
before taxes and does not justify such a dispoportionate award of
property.

Also, the lost income to the Defendant is irrelevant,

as the court awarded the Plaintiff sufficient alimony to meet her
needs.

She was awarded alimony of $600 per month, which, with

her income of $540 and rental income of $850 per month, is
sufficient to meet her needs, as found by the court, of $2,000
per month.
In any case, assuming the Defendant had continued teaching
school, his income would not have been around the $3,000 per
month already imputed to him by the Court.

His expenses would

not have been any lower, leaving the same $600 available for
alimony, regardless of whether he was still teaching.

17

B.

FINDING 42

In its amended findings, the court found that:
The Defendant, in violation of a then existing Court
Order, liquidated his retirement account. Although
some of those funds were used to assist the Plaintiff
with reference to acquisition of her condominium, most
of the funds were used to pay a debt incurred in
conjunction with the Defendant's opening a business
against the Plaintiff's will, while the parties were
still married, as asset which, according to the Court's
findings, now has no value. In essence, the Defendant
dissipated almost all of that retirement account.
Plaintiff should receive a greater share of the balance
of the marital estate.
This finding faults the Defendant for liquidating the
retirement in violation of a temporary order and for dissipating
the retirement account.

Again, the $70,000 retirement account is

insufficient grounds to award the Plaintiff 97.75% of a marital
estate with a net worth of two-thirds of million dollars.
The temporary order only prohibited the Defendant from
alienating property without the Plaintiff's consent.

The

Plaintiff and Defendant did stipulate to the uses the retirement
funds would be put.

Further, the court, in its findings, found

that the Defendant did liquidate the retirement account to put a
substantial down payment on Plaintiff's condominium and pay off
other debts, including a portion of the Arma-Coating debt, in
order to obtain financing for Plaintiff's condominium.

Although

the court found that the Defendant did liquidate his retirement
account voluntarily, it "acknowledged the responsibility that he
felt he had to provide for his then ex-wife's housing needs in a
manner appropriate to her standing of living." (R. 503).
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There

was no evidence given that Defendant did dissipate "almost all"
of the retirement account:

a portion was contributed to the

condominium, some was used to pay the Arma-Coating debt, and the
court made no findings, and there was no evidence taken,
regarding the remainder.
Equitably, the Plaintiff also invested the earnest money in
the condominium without Defendant's knowledge or consent.

The

condominium had a net negative value at the time of trial.
Plaintiff elected to purchase the condominium and incurr the
additional debt when neither of the parties had a substantial
income.

The trial court is attempting to punish the Defendant

for actions substantially similar to those of the Plaintiff.
C.

FINDING 43

The third additional findings provides that:
The Plaintiff is clearly unable to support herself at
the standard of living to which she is entitled with
the amount of alimony awarded by the Court and her own
earned income. According to the trial Court's
findings, although the Defendant would have sufficient
income to meet his needs by paying $600.00 per month to
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, even with that $600.00 of
alimony, still falls approximately $900.00 short each
month of being able to meet her financial needs.
This finding is contradicted by the court's other findings
regarding the Plaintiff's income and needs, and in any case is
insufficient to award the Plaintiff 97.75% of such a substantial
estate.

One-half of the marital estate has a value, as

established by the court, of over one-third million dollars.
With such a sizable estate, Plaintiff should have sufficient
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income to meet her needs.
D.

FINDING 44

The final additional finding related to the court states:
Although, technically, the Plaintiff may not have
acquired a financial interest in the Mountain Meadows
Ranch because of work she performed on that property
during the parties' marriage and while it was still
titled in the name of the Defendant's parents,
equitably, her contribution toward that asset ought to
be considered and supports the Court's ultimate award
of marital property.
The court seems to indicate that the ranch was deeded to
Plaintiff as some sort of compensation.
evidence was given at trial.

However, no such

The deeds and probate records,

which Judge Shumate inspected, clearly establish that the
inheritance was to Clint Lytle only; if the ranch was intended to
be some sort of compensation, the Defendant's parents could have
so provided.

In any case, can the Plaintiff possibly claim that

she was not adequately compensated for her efforts on behalf of
the Defendant's parents: the 40 acres of property gifted to
Plaintiff and Defendant by Defendant's parents during the
marriage, had a value, using the current values found by the
court, of $1,520,000.

No evidence was given that Defendant

expected any compensation from the estate of Defendant's parent
for her efforts, or that they agreed to so compensate her.
Additionally, there is no indication from the record that
Defendant received a disproportionate share of his parent's
estate for Plaintiff's "contribution".
The court's theory awards the Plaintiff an equitable
20

interest in property which was not owned by the parties or
acquired during the marriage of for that matter during the
entirety of the trial and post-trial proceedings. How can the
Plaintiff have an equitable interest in property in which the
parties' has absolutely no right or interest?

Defendant did not

obtain title to the property until after the parties' separation,
or, ultimately, after trial.

Until the proper deed was recorded,

Defendant had a mere expectancy, and no right to the ranch.

What

the court is awarding the Plaintiff is an equitable interest in
the estate of the Defendant's parents rather than the marital
estate.
The court made no findings to justify such a result.

Under

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993), the trial
court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific,
detailed findings supporting its financial determinations.
Findings are adequate if they are sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.

There

are no sufficiently detailed findings regarding Plaintiff's
"contribution" for this court to determine what subsidiary facts
justify such a result.
In any case, the trial court's finding is directly contrary
to the directions given in
304(Utah 1988).

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d

In Mortesen, Justice Howe, speaking to the issue

of making a division of the marital property, held that trial
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courts should not award the other spouse an additional amount of
property equal to the gift or inheritance in order to equalize
the distribution even when the gift or inheritance is received
during the marriage.

If the trial court were to make such an

offset, it would have the effect of depriving the heir spouse of
the benefit of his gift or inheritance.

This rule "accords with

the normal intent of donors or deceased persons that their gifts
and inheritances should be kept within their family and
succession should not be diverted because of divorce."
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308.
II.
1.

PROPERTY DIVISION

THE COURT FAILED TO SEPARATE MARTIAL AND SEPARATE PROPERTY
The Court made no specific finding regarding whether the

ranch was marital property.

The trial court should "first

properly categorize the parties' property as part of the martial
estate or as the separate property of one of the other."
Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1993).

Burt v.

The trial court

abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed
findings supporting its financial determinations.
858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993).

Hall v. Hall,

In the above two cases,

the trial courts failed to identify marital and separate property
and the cases were remanded to the trial court in order for
additional findings to be made.
Although the trial court failed to make a specific finding,
there may be a record sufficient to conclude that the ranch is
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separate property.

First, the Plaintiff's counsel did concede at

trial that the ranch was separate property and that Plaintiff did
not have a claim thereto.

(R. 600, 601).

Second, the Court did

state at a hearing after trial that the ranch was separate
property. (R. 1039) .

Third, it is clear from the circumstances

of the case, as outlined below, that the ranch could not be
marital property.
2.

THE RANCH IS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY
Inherited property is generally regarded as separate from

the marital estate.
App. 1990) .

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct.

Courts have considered inherited property as part of

the martial estate when the other spouse has by his or her
efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited or
donated property, when the parties have inextricably commingled
the property with marital property so that it has lost its
separate character, or when the recipient spouse has contributed
all of part of the property to the marital estate.

Burt, 799

P.2d at 1169.
In this instant matter, the Court made no specific finding
that the ranch was separate property.

However, it is clear from

the record that Defendant did not obtain clear title to the
inherited property until after the parties were separated, or,
possibly, after trial.

The Plaintiff has had no opportunity to

augment, maintain, or protect the inherited or donated property.
At the time the property was quitclaimed to the Defendant, the
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parties were already separated.

Further, there was no

opportunity to inextricably commingle the property with marital
property, nor has the Plaintiff contributed all or part of the
property to the marital estate.

In fact, virtually all of the

marital estate was contributed by Defendant's parents.
3.

THIS IS NOT A CASE OF EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES
When inherited property has not lost it identity, the

court may award it to the non-heir spouse in lieu of alimony and
in other extraordinary situations when equity so demands.
799 P.2d at 1169.

Burt,

This is apparently the justification used by

the court in its award of property(R. 1123).

However, this

exception is not applicable to this case for two reasons.

First,

alimony was awarded in this case. Second, extraordinary
circumstances can justify the award of inherited property, not a
disproportionate award of marital property.

Burt, id.

In any event, no extraordinary circumstances were described
by the court.

The four additional findings made by the court,

described above, are hardly exceptional.

The retirement account

was liquidated for Plaintiff's benefit, the alimony awarded is
sufficient for her needs, and the trial court can not award the
Plaintiff an interest in the estate of the Defendant's parents.
A case of exception circumstances was Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d
1369 (Utah 1988) .

In Noble, the husband shot the wife in the

head at close range with a rifle while she was lying on their
bed.

She was permanently disabled.
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The court therein approved

an award of the husband's premarital property to the wife.
4.

THE COURT MAY NOT GIVE DEFENDANT A SMALLER PORTION OF THE

MARITAL ESTATE TO OFFSET HIS INHERITANCE
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her
separate property and fifty percent of marital property.

Hall v.

Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Burt v. Burt 799
P.2d at 1172.

An unequal distribution of the parties' marital

property must be accompanied by findings justifying the decision.
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022.
The trial court in this matter basically awarded the
Plaintiff the entire net value of the marital estate and the
Defendant the ranch with sufficient funds to pay the marital
debts.

This leaves Plaintiff with a net value of $650,0000 and

Defendant with $790,000.

When the court made its decision, Judge

Shumate was under the mistaken impression that the marital debts
were actually $100,000 greater than the parties had stipulated,
resulting in an award of $690,000 to the Defendant and $650,000
to Plaintiff, which is fairly close to a 50/50 split (R. 1038).
This "equitable" award basically offsets Defendant's inheritance
against his interest in the marital estate.
This Court of Appeals, in Mortensen v. Mortensen. disaproved
of this practice.

That case provided that in dividing the

marital estate:
the donee or heir spouse should not lose the benefit of
his or her gift or inheritance by the trial court's
automatically or arbitrarily awarding the other spouse
an equal amount of the remaining property which was
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acquired by their joint efforts to offset the gift or
inheritance. Any significant disparity in the division
of the remaining property should be based on an
equitable rationale other than on the sole fact that
one spouse is awarded his or her gifts or inheritance.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308.
In Mortensen, supra, the trial court awarded the husband
stock inherited by him during the marriage and awarded the wife
two-thirds of the remaining marital estate.

In the opinion by

Justice Howe, the court reviewed prior Utah case law.

The court

cites with approval cases where property was awarded to the
spouse which inherited it or brought it into the marriage,
including Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedes
v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson,
610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980); Humphries v. Humphries, 520 P.2d 193
(1974); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Newmeyer v.
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987).
After further reviewing the above cases and the law of other
jurisdictions, the Court held that:
trial courts making "equitable" property division
pursuant to Section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with
the rule of most other jurisdictions and with the
division made in may of our own cases, generally award
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance
during the marriage . . . to that spouse, . . . unless
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or
expenses contributed to the enhancement, maintainence,
or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an
interest in it, . . . or (2) the property has been
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift
of an interest therein to the other spouse.
Cf.
Jesperson
v. Jesperson,
610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308.

The Court noted exceptions where
26

part of the gift or inheritance was awarded in lieu of alimony.
Otherwise, the property should be divided equally between the
parties.

Id.

In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the
Defendant received an inheritance, the value of which was
substantially increased during the marriage.

Proceeds from the

inheritance were utilized by the Defendant to purchase a home.
At trial, the Court awarded the Plaintiff the marital home and
other assets.

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court's

intended analysis "was apparently that Plaintiff was entitled to
an equitable offset against" the Defendant's inherited property.
The Court stated that "Each party is presumed to be entitled to
all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the
marital property."

Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172.

The trial court, on

remand, was instructed to "first properly categorize the parties
property as part of the marital estate or as separate property, "
after which point the court may consider exceptional
circumstances.

Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172.

Here, as discussed

above, the findings made by the court do not show sufficient
"extraordinary circumstances."
In Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973), the
Plaintiff, after the commencement of the divorce proceedings, but
before trial, received an inheritance from her uncle, Dr. Hirth.
The Court awarded the Plaintiff sixty percent of the substantial
marital estate, alimony and attorneys fees.
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Defendant appealed

on the grounds that the court failed to take into consideration
the plaintiff's interest in the estate of Dr. Hirth and whatever
expectancy she may have had in the estate of her elderly mother.
The court took no consideration of these factors.

Like Dubois, a

party in this action had, after the parties separation but before
trial, received a substantial inheritance or had an expectancy of
receiving an inheritance.

As in that case, those factors do not

effect the distribution of the marital estate.
In the case of Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (1979), the wife
was awarded 90 percent of the assets accumulated by the parties
during the marriage.

The Court stated:

When a marriage has failed, a court's duty is to
consider the various factors relating to the situation
and to arrange the best allocation of the property and
the economic resources of the parties so that the
parties and their children can pursue their lives in as
happy and useful manner as possible. If it appears
that the decree is so discordant with an equitable
allocation that it will morelkely lead to further
difficulties and distgress than to serve the desired
objective, then a reappraisal of the decree must be
undertaken. In view of these principles, it is our
view that the property award in this case is far too
disparate and that the decree must be modified.
Read, 594 P.2d at 872.

The "far too disparate" award in the Read

case at least allowed the husband 10% of the marital estate.

Mr.

Lytle was only allotted 2.25% of the assets of his marriage by
the trial court.
The trial court's award does not allow the parties to
"pursue their lives" as proscribed by Read, supra.

The

Defendant's portion of the marital estate will just cover the
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debts he has been ordered to pay, leaving him with two
unprofitable businesses and the ranch, which also produces no
income.

The Plaintiff, meanwhile, is awarded alimony, a home,

and over half a million dollars of other assets, debt free.
5.

THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE RANCH AND SHOULD

NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE COURT
The Court does not have jurisdiction over property which the
parties do not own at the time of the divorce being entered.

See

Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1995);
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977).

There are two

factors which govern the includability of assets as marital
property subject to division:
First, all assets acquired by the parties during the
marriage are to be considered by the trial court when making
an equitable distribution, unless the law specifically
prevents the court from considering a particular asset.
Second, a marital asset is defined as any right that has
accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit.
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d at 837.
Here, evidence introduced at trial indicates that, because
of problem with the chain of title and deed, Defendant did not
have title to the ranch property.

This asset was not "acquired

during the marriage" under the above standard.

The Defendant had

no enforceable right in the property, but only an expectancy.
Further, the Defendant's expectancy was not a "right that has
accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit."
III.
1.

ALIMONY AWARD

ERROR TO AWARD ALIMONY IN THIS ACTION
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The award of alimony is inapropriate in this case, where the
Plaintiff, even if she was awarded one-half of the marital
estate, would have sufficient resources to meet her needs.

In

Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973), the Plaintiff, was
awarded sixty percent of the substantial marital estate, alimony
and attorneys fees.

The Court held that "it appears that the

assets awarded to the plaintiff [are] sufficient to maintain her
in the manner to which she has been accustomed without periodic
payments from the defendant," and reduced the award of alimony to
$1.00 per year.
In Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the
Defendant had substantial inherited property and was awarded
alimony.

The court of appeals, in a footnote, questioned whether

alimony was appropriate where the defendant had substantial
accumulated wealth, and stated that "Proper distribution of
inherited property should have come first, and only then would
alimony be considered."

Burt, 799 P.2d at 1170.

Half of the

martial estate in this matter would amount to one-third of a
million dollars, almost all of which was donated by the
Defendant's parents.

With such an award, alimony is inapropriate

in this case.
2.

INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO IMPUTE INCOME TO DEFENDANT
The court also improperly imputed income to the Defendant.

In Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the trial court
imputed income to the Defendant.
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The Court of Appeals held that

the trial court could not impute income for alimony and child
support without making the statutorily required findings under
Section 78-45-7.5 (7) (b) that he was voluntarily underemployed.
The court in this action also made no such finding.

It is clear

from the record that Defendant is not making the $3,000 per month
imputed to him by the court.

The court merely states that he is

capable of making that amount.
CONCLUSION
The trial court in this case clearly attempted to equitably
apportion the property of the parties by improperly including the
Defendant's inherited property in his calculations; property
which, in fact, properly came in the Defendant's possession only
after trial.

The Court of Appeals has held in Burt and

Mortensen, supra, that a trial court can not consider an
inheritance to unequally divide he marital estate.

The theory of

the Plaintiff, adopted by the trial court in its amended
findings, argues that the Plaintiff should be awarded some sort
of equitable interest in the ranch.

However, for this theory to

succeed, this equitable interest would have to arise while the
property was not even owned by the parties.

Reaching such a

conclusion awards the Plaintiff an equitable interest in the
estate of the Defendant's parents, contrary to their wishes,
rather than in the marital estate, and basically re-writes the
will of Ezra and Mae Lytle.
The Plaintiff also argues that the Defendant should be
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punished for liquidating his inheritance, despite the stipulation
of the parties and the fact that, as the court found, the
retirement was liquidated by the Plaintiff in order to provide a
suitable home for the Plaintiff, which Plaintiff purchased
despite already occupying the marital home.
The additional findings made by the District Court should be
reversed are contradicted by the record and the court own prior
findings, and should be vacated as clearly erroneous and on
procedural grounds.
The court in awarding alimony should first consider the
property of the parties.

Where, as here, the marital estate is

substantial and the Plaintiff is left largely debt free, no award
of alimony should have been made, both because the it is
unwarranted, and because the trial court imputed income to the
Defendant but failed to find that he was voluntarily
underemployed.
An equitable distribution of the marital property in this
case would award each party one-half of the marital estate.
Plaintiff could still receive, free and clear of all debts, her
condominium, the marital home, which could provide her with
rental income as found by the trial court, and an the undeveloped
lot.

By awarding the entire 22 acres to the Defendant and all

of the marital debts, each party would receive marital assets
worth approximately $330,000.

A table showing this proposed

distribution is included in the addendum.
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The "far to disparate" award in Read, supra, was much more
equitable than the present action.

Clint Lytle was awarded 2.25%

of the marital estate, almost all of the value of which was
derivative of substantial inter vivos gifts made by his parents.
In order to allow the parties to "pursue their lives," the court
should order that the marital property be distributed as
described above or remand the case to the district court for
further findings consistent with Utah law.
Equally simply stated, the lower court in light of Utah law
and Plaintiff's concession that she made no claim to the ranch of
Defendant's parents, should not have considered that "to be
inherited" property in its calculations.

If Defendant's parents

had wanted to name the Plaintiff in their will, they could have
done so.

The lower court's award of substantially all of the

marital estate in this case is erroneous and jurisdictionally
overreaching.
DATED this 11th day of August, 1997.
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I, Michael D. Hughes, certify that on August 11th I served
two copies of the attached Brief of Appellant upon G. Michael
Westfall, the counsel for the appellee in this matter, by mailing
it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to
the following address:
G. Michael Westfall
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 847

Attorney of Record
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-5 (1993)
(1)

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include

in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts
or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent
children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the
payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the
parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective
creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts,
obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties1 separate,
current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title
62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or

A. 1

after January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an
order assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month
check processing fee to be included in the amount withheld and
paid to the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of
Human Services for the purposes of income withholding in
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5.
(2)

The court may include, in an order determining child

support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of
the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing
the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the
custodial parent.
(3)

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent

changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a)

In determining visitation rights of parents,

grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the
court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace

A. 2

officer enforcement, the court may include in an order
establishing a visitation schedule a provision, among other
things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court ordered
visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5)

If a petition for modification of child custody or

visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the
court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys 1
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the
court determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith.
(6)

If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a

visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of
the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a
visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party
because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise
court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a)

The court shall consider at least the following factors

in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce
income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.

A. 3

(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of
living, existing at the time of separation, in determining
alimony in accordance with Subsection

(a). However, the court

shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living
that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that
existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to
equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold
of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in
dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage,
the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the
marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration
dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the
condition which existed at the time of the marriage.

A. 4

(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of
the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at
the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if
the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time
prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer
period of time.
(8)

Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise,

any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that
former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found

A. 5

to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment
and his rights are determined.
(9)

Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former

spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony
that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.5 (1996)
(1)

As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:

(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned
sources, except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses,
rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay,
pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous
marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits,
workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation,
disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2)

Income from earned income sources is limited to the

equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job,
the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3)

Specifically excluded from gross income are:

(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);

A. 6

(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job
Training Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or
General Assistance; and
© other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a
parent.
(4) (a)

Gross income from self-employment or operation of a

business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses
required for self-employment or business operation from gross
receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or
operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an
appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to
allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be
deducted from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from
the amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a)

When possible, gross income should first be computed on

an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average
gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income.
Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer
statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the
most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not
reasonably available. Verification of income from records
maintained by the Office of Employment Security may be

A. 7

substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax
returns.
© Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine
whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6)

Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under

Subsection (7).
(7) (a)

Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent

stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based
upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived from
work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings
for persons of similar backgrounds in the community.
© If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed
at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To
impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or
the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter
specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the
imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions
exist:
(I) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents 1 minor
children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn;

A. 8

(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent ! s presence in the home.
(8) (a)

Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who

is the subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child
in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security Income,
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the
earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to the
parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the
amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other
unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a
parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.

A. 9

Amended Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law
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SAMUEL G. DRAPER (Bar No. 7050)
HUGHES & READ
Attorneys for Defendant
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801)673-4892

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MYRLENE LYTLE,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

V.

CLINTON EZRA LYTLE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 954500316
Judge James L. Shumate

THIS CAUSE came on regularly for trial on the 10th day of October, 1996, before the Court,
sitting without a jury, the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding,
the Plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by her counsel, G. Michael Westfall, of Gallian,
Westfall Wilcox and Wright, and the Defendant appearing in person and being represented by his
counsel, Samuel G. Draper, of Hughes & Read, and the Court having granted Defendant's motion to
bifurcate, and a decree of divorce having been entered on or about September 8, 1995, reserving the
issues of support, property division, and attorney's fees for determination at trial, and the Court having
heard the evidence offered by the parties admitted herein, and being fully advised in the premises,
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT MAKES AND ENTERS THE FOLLOWING:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The parties were married on the 2nd of March, 1957, and were divorced on the 8th of

September, 1995, under a Bifurcated Decree of Divorce.
2.

During the parties' marriage, the Defendant taught school in California.

3.

Thereafter the family moved to Utah where the Defendant worked for approximately 7

years for his father in the ranching operation and then began teaching school where he taught within the
Washington County School District for a period of 17 years, while also during that period of time
working on a ranching operation with his father, and after his father's death, he continued to work the
ranching operation.
4.

In 1995 the Defendant took a leave of absence from the Washington County School

District, but did not return to that employment thereafter.
5.

Prior to his leave of absence, he had earned as much as $4,000.00 per month.

6.

At the time of his leave of absence, his income earning capacity, in view of his

experience, his age, and his health, including cardiac problems in 1988 and surgery at that time, the
Court finds that the Defendant's earning capacity was $3,000.00 per month.
7.

During the term of the marriage, the Plaintiff raised the family, assisted the Defendant on

the ranch, kept the house, bottled fruit, helped in the ranching operation, and generally supported both
parties' economic efforts in making the marriage and the family operation work.
8.

The parties have substantial assets, but received almost all of the present-day wealth from

the Defendant's parents in the forms of gifts of real estate, either by inheritance, or out-right gift during
the term of the marriage.
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9.

However, on top of those gifts, their joint efforts of producing income and, also, in non-

dollar producing efforts, but valuable efforts, contributed by the Plaintiff, Mrs. Lytle, added to the values
produced by the gifts and inheritance from the Defendant's father and mother.
10.

Their life style prior to the marriage was not lavish, but certainly comfortable.

11.

They were able to obtain and have new cars; take trips and short vacations; dine out on

regular basis; acquire fur and some amounts of jewelry for the Plaintiff; and the Defendant was able to
continue an uneconomic, what the Court would describe as a hobby, ranching operation on the property
at Mountain Meadow.
12.

Since the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff has taken employment at J.C. Penny's where

she is able to produce about $540.00 per month.
13.

Since the time of the divorce, the Defendant withdrew $56,015.00 from his retirement

account.
14.

That is a net to him, as a substantial portion for taxes was retained.

15.

The Defendant made the choice to use that money to refinance the Arma Coating

business and also put a substantial down payment on the Condominium which the Plaintiff is now
occupying.
16.

The Court determines that Defendant did that voluntarily, but acknowledges the

responsibility that he felt he had to provide for his then ex-wife's housing needs in a manner appropriate
to her standard of living.
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17.

Allegations of adultery have been made in this matter, but as the Court has previously

ruled that is not proven by the burden of proof required.
18.

At the present setting, the Plaintiff remains single, living in her condominium, working at

Penny's, and unable to meet her needs at the present time with anywhere near the level that had been
hers during the term of the marriage, and her ability to meet her needs now falls short of her actual
needs.
19.

Since the time of the divorce the Defendant has remarried, is living at his wife's home,

and is working more than full-time at the two businesses, the Boat Shop, now known as Hi-Desert
Marine, and the Arma Coating business, and is making a good-faith and genuine effort to produce
income at the same or hopefully even above the levels that he enjoyed while he was teaching.
20.

The Plaintiffs expenses are $2,000.00 per month.

21.

The Court finds that the Defendant's reasonable expenses are $2,400.00 a month.

22.

The debt on the Cadillac has now been paid, and is no longer an obligation.

23.

The Corvette, which is included in Defendant's claims for expenses, is a drain upon the

parties assets and is an unaffordable luxury with its high insurance and monthly payment which should
be sold.
24.

At the present time, the Plaintiff and Defendant jointly own the business, Hi-Desert

Marine, which the Court finds has a negative net value.
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25.

The net value affixed by the Court is somewhat less than the accounting testimony at the

time of trial, but the Court is convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the net value of HiDesert Marine is in the neighborhood of negative $150,000.00.
26.

That business, while all the parties agree should be awarded to Mr. Lytle, has a negative

impact on the balance sheet of $150,000.00.
27.

The Defendant has run Hi-Desert Marine, paid the parties' son and supported their son

and his family from that obligation, has tried to get enough money out of it to pay the temporary orders
of support which the Court has made, and has tried to make some money himself.
28.

The Defendant has attended training and has relocated the business.

29.

The Court is convinced that Mr. Lytle is working hard to make that business profitable

and also to make the Arma Coating business equally profitable.
30.

The Court finds that Arma Coating's net worth is about $0, but has had the ability to

generate some income and acquire some assets.
31.

The Arma Coating business was acquired by an initial investments of $55,000.00, which

was borrowed, but that was refinanced with some of the money from Defendant's retirement and some of
the money from the Defendant's inheritance.
32.

At the present time, the parties have the following assets with the following stipulated

values:
a.

The home and lot located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, is worth

$149,500.00 and is more particularly described as follows:
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Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning.
b.

The condo on 489 Ridgeview Drive, St. George, is worth $135,000.00, and is

more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat T \ a Planned Unit Development
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington
County Recorder.
c.

The building lot lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black

Hill in St. George, Utah, is worth $35,000, and is more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah.
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record.
d.

The 22 acres of real estate development property has a gross value of

$836,000.00, but because of the low basis in this property held by the parties, upon its sale an
approximately $202,000.00 tax impact will be realized, so the net value of the development property is
$634,000.00.
e.

There is a possibility of an asset in Carson City, Nevada, but the parties have

agreed to split that evenly, half and half, if there is anything there, which appears unlikely.
33.

L Y t t E v I YTLC
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34.

The personal property of the parties has been divided between them by agreement with

the exception that the Bearcat Pistol which is to go to the Defendant.
35.

The Defendant should receive the Corvette vehicle and personal property in his

possession.
36

He also should receive the $7,000.00 worth of cattle.

37.

The Plaintiff should receive her Cadillac and the other personal property in her

possession.
38.

The Court finds the value of the personal property received by the Plaintiff is $16,725 00

The Court finds that exceeds her estimate by $2,000.00, because it is the Court's finding that the large
ring that she has is worth more than was estimated by her.
39.

The Defendant's personal property is worth $54,000.00. That is based upon a higher

estimate than the Defendant made because the Court finds that the value of the boat was higher than was
estimated by the Defendant.
40.

The debts of the parties are:
a.

The first mortgage on the home on Lytle Drive is $20,009.83.

b.

The home equity loan on that home is $16,039.58.

c.

The condo note and also a note secured as a third mortgage on the home, is for

d.

The note on the Corvette is $9,767.32.

e.

There are accountants fees in the amount of $ 10,546.00

$149,574.69.
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f.

The parties have agreed that if there are any debts due on the special improvement

district near the home, that they will divide that debt half and half.
41.

Looking at the debt obligation, the income producing ability of the Defendant, and the

property available to the Plaintiff by the Court's decree, the Court, looking at the needs of the parties and
finding that the Defendant has needs of $2,400.00 per month and has the ability to produce income at
$3,000.00 a month, and looking at the Plaintiffs ability to produce income, with her needs of $2,000.00
a month and her receiving $540.00 from employment, and finding that a reasonable rental value for the
home is $850.00 for a month, which the Court anticipates will generate some income for the Plaintiff,
and considering that the Plaintiff also has the building lot which is probably something that she could
sell and live off of for quite a while and maybe not even have to work for a period of time, depending on
how the development property is sold, the Court finds that a reasonable figure for alimony is a sum of
$600.00 per month until the development property sells.
42.

Attorney's fees for the Plaintiff are $15,968.00. Attorney's fees for the Defendant have

been $12,835.00 and the Court finds both these to be reasonable, and the Court complements counsel on
their work, not only the quality of their work, but the level of their fees in view of the size of this estate.
43.

The Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment on the eve of full retirement. His

doing so deprived the Plaintiff of the benefit of his income and the benefit of his retirement account had
he worked until he became entitled to full retirement benefits.
44.

The Defendant, in violation of a then existing Court Order, liquidated his retirement

account. Although some of those funds were used to assist the Plaintiff with reference to acquisition of
A. 17
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her condominium, most of the funds were used to pay a debt incurred in conjunction with the
Defendant's opening a business against the Plaintiffs will, while the parties were still married, as asset
which, according to the Court's findings, now has no value. In essence, the Defendant dissipated almost
all of that retirement account. Plaintiff should receive a greater share of the balance of the marital estate.
45.

The Plaintiff is clearly unable to support herself at the standard of living to which she is

entitled with the amount of alimony awarded by the Court and her own earned income. According to the
trial Court's findings, although the Defendant would have sufficient income to meet his needs by paying
$600.00 per month to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, even with that $600.00 of alimony, still falls
approximately $900.00 short each month of being able to meet her financial needs.
46.

Although, technically, the Plaintiff may not have acquired a financial interest in the

Mountain Meadows Ranch because of work she performed on that property during the parties' marriage
and while it was still titled in the name of the Defendant's parents, equitably, her contribution toward
that asset ought to be considered and supports the Court's ultimate award of marital property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
47.

The ranch is awarded to Defendant.

48.

The condominium and home and lot are awarded to Plaintiff.

49.

Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the

exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant.
50.

LYTLEv LYTLE
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51.

Defendant shall receive Hi-Desert Marine, subject to the encumbrances and debts

thereon, and the Anna Coating business, subject to the encumbrances and debts thereon.
52. '

Plainitiff shall be indemnified by Defendant so that the assets that she receives shall be

free and clear, which is not the case right now. The Court anticipates that when the development
pioperty sells, that will be the case. At that time, the parties can get out of debt and get some peace in
their lives.
53.

I he development piopcity shall be equally divided belwcen the paitics An undi\ ulul

one-half interest is awarded to each, and it should be sold as quickly as possible, and as quickly as is
reasonable.
54.

The Plaintiff is awarded alimony of $600.00 per month until the development propcih

55.

Upon the sale of the development property, alimony shall be reduce to the sum of

sells.

$300.00 per month because the parties will have generated adequate income to substitute for that cash
flow need.
//
//
//
//
//
//
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56.

In view of the division of the properties and the economic circumstance of the parties, it

would be error for the Court to require either party to pay the others attorney's fees and costs; therefore,
each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.
DATED this

h

day of Febroar/1997
BYTH

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND-CONTENTr*

^ M I C H A E L WESTFAU
GALLIAN, \ f e T F A l X w i L C O X AND WRIGHT
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Amended Judgment in re: Alimony, Property Division, Debt
Allocation, and Attorneys Fees
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SAMUEL G. DRAPER (Bar No. 7050)
HUGHES & READ
Attorneys for Defendant
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 673-4892
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MYRLENE LYTLE,
Plaintiff,
v.

AMENDED JUDGMENT IN RE:
ALIMONY, PROPERTY
DIVISION, DEBT ALLOCATION,
AND ATTORNEYS FEES

CLINTON EZRA LYTLE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 954500316
Judge James L. Shumate

THIS CAUSE came on regularly for trial on the 10th day of October, 1996, before the Court,
sitting without a jury, the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding,
the Plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by her counsel, G. Michael Westfall, of Gallian,
Westfall, Wilcox and Wright, and the Defendant appearing in person and being represented by his
counsel, Samuel G. Draper, of Hughes & Read, and the Court having granted Defendant's motion to
bifurcate, and a decree of divorce having been entered on or about September 8, 1995, reserving the
issues of support, property division, and attorney's fees for determination at trial, and the Court having
heard the evidence offered by the parties admitted herein, and being fully advised in the premises,

NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES THAT:
1.

The Mountain Meadows Ranc&is a&Jarded to Defendant.

2.

The following real property is awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property,

free and clear of any claim by the Defendant to the same and as between Plaintiff and Defendant:
a.

The condominium located at 489 North Ridgeview Drive, St. George, 84770, and

more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat "I", a Planned Unit Development,
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington
County Recorder.
b.

The home located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, Utah 84770, more

particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning.
c.

The building lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black

Hill in St. George, Utah, and more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah.
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record.
3.

Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the

exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant.
4.

Should the parties own an asset in Carson City, Nevada, which at the time of trial

appeared unlikely, the parties are each awarded one-half interest therein.
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2.

The following real property is awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property,

free and clear of any claim by the Defendant to the same and as between Plaintiff and Defendant:
a.

The condominium located at 489 North Ridgeview Drive, St. George, 84770, and

more particularly described as follows:
All of 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat "I", a Planned Unit Development,
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington
County Recorder.
b.

The home located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, Utah 84770, more

particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning.
c.

The building lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black

Hill in St. George, Utah, and more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah.
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record.
3.

Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the

exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant.
4.

Should the parties own an asset in Carson City, Nevada, which at the time of trial

appeared unlikely, the parties are each awarded a one-half interest therein.
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5.

Defendant shall assume the debts of the parties.

6.

If there are any debts due on the special improvement district near the home, the same

will be divided equally between the parties.
7.

Defendant shall receive Hi-Desert Marine, subject to the encumbrances and debts

thereon, and the Arma Coating business, subject to the encumbrances and debts thereon.
8.

Plaintiff shall be indemnified by Defendant so that the assets that she receives shall be

free and clear, which is not the case right now. The Court anticipates that when the development
property sells, that will be the case. At that time, the parties can get out of debt and get some peace in
their lives.
9.

The development property shall be equally divided between the parties. An undivided

one-half interest is awarded to each, and it should be sold as quickly as possible, and as quickly as is
reasonable.
10.

The Plaintiff is awarded alimony of $600.00 per month until the development property

11.

Upon the sale of the development property, alimony shall be reduce to the sum of

sells.

$300.00 per month because the parties will have generated adequate income to substitute for that cash
flow need.
//
//
//
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12.

In view of the division of the properties and the economic circumstance of the parties, it

would be error for the Court to require either party to pay the others attorney's fees and costs, therefore,
each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein

r—

DATED this

L

?

May*
day of -February; 1997
BY THE COURT.

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTEN1

G. Ml&frAEL ^ E S T F X L L
, tjALLIAN, W E S T F X L L , WILCOX AND WRIGHT
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Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Order Denying Defendant's
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order Supplementing',; y
Findings of Fact
* -

GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #34 34
59 South 100 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 628-1682
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL, ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND ORDER
SUPPLEMENTING FINDINGS OF
FACT

MYRLENE LYTLE,
Plaintiff
vs .
CLINTON EZRA LYTLE,

Civil No. 954500316
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant

The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on
Tuesday, the 25th day of March, 1997 on the Defendant's Motion to
(1) Amend or Make Additional Findings, (2) Amend or Alter Judgment,
and

(3) For a New Trial and Supporting Memorandum and on the

Plaintiff's response to that motion.

The Plaintiff was present

in person and represented by her counsel of record, G. Michael
Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT.
The Defendant was present in person and represented by his counsel
of record, Samuel G. Draper and Michael D. Hughes of the lav/ firm
of HUGHES

& READ.

Counsel

for both parties wero heard with

reference to the Defendant's pending motion and the Plaintiff's
A. 25

05^dR«iy%Bfft!fetifilBtf8fi.New T r i a 1 ' 0 r d e r Denying Defendant's
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order Supplementing
Finding©l&CwSagtt he presentation of oral argument and review of the
pleadings on file, including the legal authority cited, the Court
made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Based

thereon the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied.

2.

The Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is

denied.
3.

The Findings of Fact of the Court, entered on March 3,

1997, are hereby amended and the following findings included in the
amended Findings of Fact:
a)

The Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment

on the eve of full retirement.

His doing so deprived the Plaintiff

of the benefit of his income and the benefit of his retirement
account had he worked until he became entitled to full retirement
benefits.
b)

The Defendant, in violation of a then existing Court

Order liquidated his retirement account.
funds

were

used

to

assist

the

Although some of those

Plaintiff

with

reference

to

acquisition of her condominium, most of the funds were used to pay
a debt

incurred

in conjunction with the Defendant's opening a

business against the Plaintiff's will, while the parties were still
married, an asset which, according to the Court's findings, now has
no value. In essence, the Defendant dissipated almost all of that
retirement account.

Plaintiff should receive a greater share of

the balance of the marital estate.
2
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c)

The Plaintiff is clearly unable to support herself at

the standard of living to which she is entitled with the amount of
alimony awarded by the Court and her own earned income. According
to the trial Court's findings, although the Defendant would have
sufficient income to meet his needs by paying $600.00 pei month to
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, even with that $600.00 of alimony,
still falls approximately $900.00 short each month of being able to
meet her financial needs.
d)

Although,

technically,

the Plaintiff may not

have

acquired a financial interest in the Mountain Meadows Ranch because
of work she performed on that property during the parties' marriage
and

while

it

was

still

titled

in

the

name

of

the

Defendant's

parents, equitably, her contribution toward that asset ought to be
considered

and

supports

the

Court's

ultimate

award

property.

DATED this

J J)

day of

/M/t *l y/

, 1997

BY THE COURT £ OF Up
>•

••» '

James I*. Shumate"?District Court Judgte/^"
APPROVED AS TO FORM

A^^^rQ

/(J&Tt&L

Samuel G. D r a p e r
A t t o r n e y for Defendant
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of

marital

PROPOSED DIVISION OF MARITAL ESTATE

Property or Debt

Method of Acquisition

Value
Awarded to
Defendant

Value
Awarded to
Plaintiff

634,000

22 acres of
development
property

Gift from Defendant's
parents (originally 40
acres)

Building lot

Acquired during
marriage with property
gifted from Defendant's
parents

Personal property

Acquired during
marriage

Home on Lytle
Drive

Gift from Defendant's
parents

149,500.00

Condominium

Purchased by Plaintiff
after separation

135,000.00

Mortgage on
condominium

Incurred after
separation

-149,574.69

Hi-Desert Marine
Business

Acquired by parties
during marriage

-150,000.00

ArmaCoating
Business

Acquired by Defendant
since separation

Mortgage on
marital home

Incurred during
marriage

-20,009.83

Home equity line
on marital home

Incurred during
marriage

-16,039.58

Debt on
Defendant's
Corvette

Incurred during
marriage

-9,767.32

Accountant fees

35,000.00

54,000.00

16,725.00

0.00

[ -10,546.00

Value of marital assets awarded to each
party:

332,062.58 1
49.69%

Percentage of marital assets awarded to
each party:

A. 28

336,225.00
50.31%

